I
In a sense, indeed, he had no career, and perhaps it was this very withdrawal from public activity which His father destined him for the profession of law, and as legal positions were so largely a matter of purchase, the Seigneur de Montaigne could give his son a most advantageous start. He was duly subjected to the requisite training, obtained formal qualification, and was given a place in the Court of Aids ofPerigueux. Such was the scandalous procedure of the time that in his twentyfifth year he found himself on the Bench of the Supreme Court of Justice. But it. was wholly against his will. Montaigne used to say that his knowledge of jurisprudence was merely that such a study existed, and he admired the wisdom of the King of Spain in excluding all lawyers and s tudents of law from the Spanish colonies, lest the discords of the Old World should be reproduced in the New.' The violence of his language on this poin t is partly explicable by the peculiar nature of the trials in which, from time to time, he must have been called upon to act. It chanced that the years of Montaigne's judicial office were those of fierces t conflict between the French monarchy and the Huguenots; he retired just two years before the St. Bartholomew massacre. The records of the Parlement of Bordeaux for this period are strewn with savage edicts of persecution, and we can guess how these must have been regarded by the author of the Essais. Scornful as .he ·was of the Reformation movement,' Montaigne's master passion was hatred of cruelty. But what availed his solitary protes t on the Bench? I t is not strange that he has left no memorandum of any particular horror in which he may have been officially and compulsorily involved. The death of his two older brothers brought him, unexpectedly, in 1570 the inheritance of the ,. family estates, so that he was able to escape from the work he despised to a leisure for thought and study. Among the most familiar of literary inscriptions are the lines on the wall s of his chateau, in which, when no more than thirty-seven years old, he recorded his most welcome hejira.
So began his rural retirement, suspended once when in 1582 he was prevailed upon, with very hard persuasion, to accept the mayoralty of Bordeaux, and occasionally interrupted for a journey to his publisher in Paris, or for a holiday trip in Germany, in Italy, or in Switzerland. What of the social obligations of noblesse? Montaigne was never a rich man; not only had he little to spare for anyone else, but he felt that his own establishment ~as necessarily rather mean, and his travelling had to be strictly limited by cost . . He complied, however, with a custom which had of late established itself, that on taking up his inheritance a seigneur should be presented to his sovereign. So Montaigne reported himself at courtthe strange court of Charles IX. He there even became "gentleman-in-ordinary of the bed-chamber," but the duties of the office thus indicated have so far eluded the research of antiquaries. A legend was long current that he was appointed secretary to the Queen Dowager. Words fail one to depict the paradox of a situation in which, say during August, 1572, the letters of Catherine de Medicis were dictated to Michel de Montaigne! But the legend has been altogether discredited by the discovery of a Jacques de Montaigne who held that most . questionable of posts.
What deterred Montaigne, or at least what he thought deterred him, from an active career of any kind, either legal or political, was not so much the desire for leisure as a senSI tlve consci~nce. He was no recluse; he loved human con tacts, could enjoy nothing fully unless he could share it" and extolled the educative value of travel. But he writes that "innocencie it selfe could not in these times nor negotiate without dissimulation nor trafficke without lying.'" The chief report he has to make upon his thirteen years in ' the Parlement of Bordeaux is that he had watched his fellow-judges too long to retain any belief in their integrity.' He knew that in politics a man is expected to cheat for the commonwealth just as a soldier must be ready to die for it, but he did not choose to be among those patriots who can sacrifice honour as willingly as life.-In an outburst of austere virtue, Montaigne once declared that no man should be untrue to his word even if it were a promise of payment to thieves who were holding him for ransom.' It scarcely needs a Machiavellian to question so stern an imperative as that; at all events it is superfluous to explain further why such a rigorist withdrew from politics in the France of Catherine de Medicis. Sometimes, too, it occurred to Montaigne that his talent, as well as his conscience, migh t prove to be of the wrong sort for public life. As he once observed, a man may be good at composing essays, but not at working effec ts.
Putting together data scattered through his wri tings, we can construct a tolerable ou tline of his person in rural re tiremen f. In physique, he was below the , middle heigh t,' wi th a thick reddish moustache,' a harsh voice,' a hand too stiff to write legibly," and eyes so easily tired ' Ill, p, 
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that most of his books had to be read aloud to him by others. 1l A man notable for his incapacities, living on a country estate which filial devotion led him to preserve as his father had left it,l2 but himself so unobservant as scarcely to know a cabbage from a lettuce, to recognize the commonest farming operations, or to distinguish all the current French coins, and with a memory so fickle as to be unable to call his servants by name." Someone suggested that this was mere affectation; but Montaigne became very resentful,. protesting that his defects were perfectly genuine1<-for instance, that it was a distress to him to be unable to address an audience without comm itting his speech to memory, especially because his memory was so hard to store and so given to leakage." People reproached him for coldness and aloofness; he acknowledged that he was, indeed, extremely lazy, but thought he was at least mild of manner, preferring to acquiesce rather than to quarrel, and if not very anxious to be popular, at all events planning not to be hated." One is not surprised by his occasional failure. His method, he says, was to "speak conformably to the common insipience,"17 and perhaps he allowed his method to be too obvious.
II
The first two books of the Essais appeared in 1580, the third and last in 1588. They are rich in suggestiveness for contemporary circumstances and manners. Spiritually, no excitement of its dawn nor in the quiet confidence of its noonday; rathe' r in the sober disillusion men t of its decline. He could remember how his father had been aflame with its promise, how the wandering scholars had been sought after and entertained at the chateau of Montaigne like saints of the Middle Ages, how each word that fell from their lips had been heard as an oracle.' For his own part, he still loved those wandering scholars, but with a love that fell short of worship. The novelty had passed off, and the New Learning had not fulfilled its promise. "Schoolmaster" had become a term of reproach, as the term "scholar" and-by association-the very name of "Greek" had been in the Rome of Plutarch's day. Montaigne records a conversation he had with a reflective lady, who explained to him that this reproach was just, because people had seen to their disappointment that knowledge comes but wisdom lingers. It seemed to this lady that there was a reason why that old adage must always be corroborated; was not the space in one's mind limited, so that the native product is quickly cramped.····" and crushed under a weight of imports? The metaphm from a warehouse did not commend itself to Montaigne, and he suggested instead that perhaps the mind overfed with facts is like a plant choked with too much moisture, or a lamp dimmed with too much oil. And yet, he adds, this is but a surface resemblance, for the more the mind is replenished, the more it stretches.' A change he notes from the days of his own boyhood is that the romances of chivalry have displaced Latin literature! Those romances, at the very time he was writing of them, may well have begun to occupy the satiric genius of Cervan tes. They roused our essayist to an exceptional explosion: "Of such idle, time-consuming and wit-besotting trash 'II, p, 126, 11> pp. 134.5. af baakes," he writes, "wherein yauth dath cam manly ammuse it selfe, I was nat so. much as acquainted with their names, and to. this day knaw nat their badies nar what they cantain.'" But the Renaissance, whase spirit he thus watched, samewhat sadly, in its decline, was a mavement whase fascinatian far him had at its best been mare intense than extended-' perhaps, indeed, limited fram the first to. ane af its many sides. Far its scientific pragress, far example, he had cared nat at all-no. mare than Erasmus. He mentians a recent refarm af the calendar, shartening the French year by ten days, that scientists might -keep human reckaning in carrespandence with the sun: what conce~vable difference, Man taigne asks, has this made, ar can it ever make, "to. man 's lat? He understaad that Capernicus had shown the earth to. mave raund the sun, whereas previaus astranamers had thaught the sun maved raund the earth; but why, in heaven's name, shauld anyane care?' A thausand years later, bath views might " .well be discredited in favaur af same yet undreamed af third. Mantaigne was fand af travelling in Italy, the first hame af the Renaissance; but if he knew anything af the appearance fram the printing-presses af was laid upon our race for a scourge.' And of the prevalen t desire to explore causation he remarks 'that. knowledge of causes concerns only him who hath the condu, ct of things, "not us who have bu t the sufferance of them.'" Nor had he more than the mildest interest in the Renaissance exploration of the globe. He knew that the achievement. of Columbus had been quickly followed by those of Cortes and Pizarro, both of whom had lived into his own time, and that within the previous half-century a new world had been discovered as large and as populous as the old. ' But what this chiefly suggested to him was the pity that such a chance had not fallen to some humane and cultured general of classical times; to Alexander, for example, by whom the native peoples would have been "polished, reformed and incivilised,'" rather than to those treacherous Christian Spaniards whose name had been made a synonym for barbarity and greed. On the other hand, unaffected as he was by the stimulants of advancing science and widening exploration, Montaigne had limitless intellectual eagerness in a different field. In his own words, he was pestered with the importunity of his mind.' It was an importunity forever at work, not upon cosmic mysteries, but upon human values. Montaigne was a humanist as Socrates was a humanist, disregarding mere physical speculations, turning away from Copernicus as Socrates from Anaxagoras, bringing back the motto fvw8, u,a.".6v as the very sum of wi sdom . The two men were separated in time by two millennia, millennia which had seen such transformations as the rise and fall of the Roman Empire, the birth and diffusion of the Christian Church, the development of papal power, the ' 11, p. growth of feudal society. But in Montaigne it is the Socratic revival which so dominates as. to make one doubt whether he refl ec ted any of the intervening influences at all. What other analogue can come to mind as we hear him posing his problems in conduct, citing tentative definitions, marshalling illustrative cases, and concluding somewhat mournfully that it is very hard to be sure? Is there not even a parallel to his emphatic acquiescence in the discipline of the Catholic Church when we recall those las t words: ''Cri to, I owe a cock to Aesculapius; do not omit to pay the debt"?
The parallel is, indeed, far from complete. A Socratic spirit, but by no means the Socratic depth or power, had appeared again. Montaigne was no creative thinker, and it was by no means merely the accident of better early training in Latin than in Greek which made him seek his philosophy in Seneca and even in Cicero rather than in Aristotle or Plato. He was lit tl e addicted, he says, to Greek books,' and it is suggestive that among those he read-in a French translation-his outstanding favourite was Plutarch. Passage after passage of his own ethical or social analysis, which delights one both by acuteness of thought and by felicity of expression, stops short at just the tantalizing point. One feels how the Platonic Socrates wO\lld have shown that the problem was not yet solved, but rather effectively opened, and that the real work must now begin. As we turn the leaf in Mon taigne, however, the next page proves to be about somethi~g quite different. second or third. And is it not this preference which separates him who is a philosopher from him who is not? " Montaigne's relation to classical authors finds, perhaps, its closest parallel in a Puritan's relation to the Bible. Latin was the language which he learned as a child before he learned French, and on which he continued to depend for special clearness and accuracy. From Latin authors he constantly borrowed phrases and maxims, terse epigram, subtle analysis, or exquisite metaphor, to convey his own deepest reflections on life. Even forty years after he had ceased conversing in it, Latin would come first to his lips in a moment of excitement. lO One thinks of the first Book which Puritan children were taught to read extensively, the only great literature with which most of them would ever be familiar, their con tinual resort in exigencies of conduct, their unfailing source of expression at an emotional crisis. Plutarch and Seneca, Montaigne once said, were the fountains from which, like the Danaides, he drew all his waterY If they were to him what Isaiah and St. Paul were to a" Puritan, is not this, indeed, the renaissance of a distant past?
A slight but suggestive token of the same kind is in his recurring allusions to suicide. His mind dwelt much on death, of which he spoke like a Stoic, hoping that when it came it would find him at his customary tasks, perhaps setting his cabbages, and careless of death's dart, but not of his defective garden. " Whether the dart should always be awaited, or may in certain circumstances be solicited, is a question Montaigne has met by citing with apparent approval those classical writers who deprecate the preservation of life at the cost of accompanying ignominy,t' and the old dictum that a wise man liveth as long as ought, not as long as he can." The time for surrendering life, he elsewhere remarks, is fixed, like the date of a note's maturing, and the troubles of old age are the usury which nature exacts for an account long over-due.
III
The aspect of Montaigne on which it is most usual to dwell is his philosophical scepticism, shown by his pictures of the variety of human judgment and the inconstancy of human action. A mere statement of anyone's definite belief rouses him to show not merely how other thinkers have contradicted it, but how the same thinker has elsewhere said or implied what is inconsistent with it, Hardly has he characterized a man by his prevailing disposi tion when he qualifies this by explaining how the same acts may be looked at from a different point of view, so that a quite contrary disposition will appear to prevail. One might say that mankind's changefulness is his favourite topic, and that his favourite thesis is the vanity of all argument because opinions can never be settled, together with the folly of praise or blame because character can never become fixed, He draws here, indeed, a most opportune moral of toleration. A man, he observes, who will burn another for an opinion must surely have amazing confidence in his own judgment. By the way, it was Rabelais who said that first; but-as Montaigne elsewhere genially remarks-if a dictum is true and apposite, the man who coined it has no right to inhibit posterity from its u,se. '
There is much more, however, than this obvious upshot of the scepticism in the Essais. Those numerous critics who are content to leave it so, must have overUll > p. 2 7. 11, p. l57. looked a group of passages which tell not only a story very different, but a story in the light of which other passages acquire a new. sense. Montaigne defines truth as inteIlectual coincidence with the custom of one's community;' but, unlike the philosophers from Plato down who have thought this a depressing conclusion, and hence have struggled to disprove it, Montaigne is not depressed by it at all. What he infers from the collapse of reasoning is the wisdom of those, plainly the great majority, to whom a method very different from reasoning has supplied both rules of life and ultimate beliefs. Nature had equipped the animal world with instinct, and was it credible that man had been overlooked?' Instinctively, all but intellectual eccentrics were content to rest upon tradition. Instead of attempting to alter the ·way of the world, they allowed the way of the world to manage them, without further inquiry.' Protestant Reformers might continue to extol a private judgment which their half-century of discords with one another showed to have been serving them so ill; but what enabled the Catholic in perfect repose to lay his head upon the pillow 6f intellectual doubt was his recognition of a will of God far above "these humane and vaine contestations.'" A passage in the first volume of the Essais here reads like a philosophic note by a devout layman to the Decrees of Trent, which had so lately been issued. Montaigne is shocked that the Mysteries of the Faith should have become material for common wrangling, and he feels that the rendering of the Sacred Books in to the vernacular of differen t coun tries is bu t a provoca tive to further profanation by the vulgar. ' Mohammedans had shown more wisdom in suffering no such translations from the Hebrew or the Arabic, and he would ad vise the teachers of logic and grammar to find some source other than the vocabulary of religion for the illustrative examples they need. It would also be well, he thinks, to exclude religious topics from the theatre. 7 For his own part, Montaigne in his consciousness of personal inability and his sense of dialectical difficulties had managed, despite the temper of debate in which he lived, to keep his hold on the ancient beliefs '-"the Catholike, Apostolike and Romane Church, wherein I w~s borne, and out of which I purpose not to die.'" It was wi thin these limi ts that he desired every speculation he had put. forward to be understood: "human fantasies and mine owne; what I discourse according to myself, not what I believe according to God."!· It is, no doubt, possible to interpret these passages as subtle and sustained irony, or as a precaution against personal risk. My reason for declining to regard them so is threefold: first, because they exhibit an attitude of mind which may be, and. often has been, quite sincere; second, because if Montaigne had been sincere in it, one can scarcely see how he could have used plainer language; and thirdly, because the hypothesis of precaution or irony is very late, and does not seem to have been entertained by one so competent, and also so critical of him, as Blaise Pascal half a century after his death.
Great significance belongs here to Montaigne's remarkable conception of "nature. " Ready as he was to criticize and mock the varying details of human belief or practice, he was convinced that fundamentally the growth of civiliza tion had been sound, not. because men had been 'II p. 364. ' I , p. 285. 01, p. 358. clever enough to contrive it so, but because of the cosmic process which had mankind in charge. I wonder whether Shakespeare, who is known to have read Florio's translation of the Essaz's, had some paragraph of this sort in mind when he wrote those lines of Hamlet in praise of "rashness"-the indiscretion which sometimes serves a man better than deep plotting, and betokens a Divini ty that shapes our ends, rough-hew them how we will.
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Here is the source of Montaigne's ever-recurring" optimism: sceptic as he was intellectually, he remains an optimist because he thinks he can see how intellectual inadequacies in the past have always been supplemented. Thus he often surprises us with some word of deference for established usage, for an established institution, and some word of contempt for radicals who would change the state or reformers who would re-cteate the church. To philosophy he assigns a twofold purpose: it should clear up confusions in average thinking, and it should also prescribe a limit beyond which even the most skilful thinking cannot pass. If it begins by promising to rid us of puzzles, it has to end by confronting us with a puzzle deeper than we had dreamed of. This is the point of many a striking paragraph, such as the one in which Montaigne contrasts the lower with the higher ignorance,ll or the one in which he agrees with Plato's Callicles, that " philosophy is a good thing provided it is taken with moderation.12 Is this salaam of preference for stupid things which have grown old over stupid things which are new, to be regarded as a mere device to make agnosticism still deeper? It may be so. But it seems to me difficult to accept the theory" that Pascal's deference to Montaigne was due either to his being wholly in the dark about what Montaigne meant, or to a fascination merely of horror felt by a devout churchman for a daring agnostic. I cannot do such violence to what appears the plain sense of passage after passage in the Essais and ih the .Pensees. Once more I think we see the besetting sin of criticismthat of forcing a great writer of the past to serve as mirror for the critic's own opinions.
Sometimes, indeed, it was hard enough for Montaigne to rest upon his reassuring conservatism. In the field of medicine, for example, he had heard of "a start-up fellow whom they call Paracelsus"" branding the traditional doctors wi th their tradi tional methods as likelier to kill than to cure. He thought this might well be true of them; all the same, he was not prepared to risk his life on the "new-fangled" speculation. More surprising, in view of his language elsewhere, is the sudden confidence he displays in legal procedure, once he has satisfied himself that law is a natural growth. A man in making his will, he thinks, should not exercise private judgment, which is likely to be capricious, .but should bear in mind that ·the wisdom of the state is higher than that of the individual, and should thus take as his pattern what the statute provides Tor cases of intestacy." The· simplest method, one might infer, would be to refrain from making a will at all, and so let the law-which here becomes the same as nature-take. its course. Such speculations, compared with Montaigne's earlier work, illustrate best of all, because they do so wi thou this · in tending it, his own central contention about the inconstancy of human judgment.
What he enjoys perhaps most is to reflect upon the essential justice of nature as shown in the amplitude of life's compensations. Disappointment, he thought, was UJI, p. 286. ulI, p. 81.
by no means the inevitable fate of man, for it depended more on inner mood than on outer event, and the mood could be modified. His ambitious friends, for example, were unhappy by reason of unfulfilled social aspiration; but for himself, "enured to a mean calling," with a humour to which the very mediocrity of his fortune so well corresponded, it was most congenial at a public ceremony neither as an unknown man to have to fight for admittance with the usher at the door, nor as a grandee to have a lane opened that he might pass through a gaping and adoring throng." Here as elsewhere Montaigne liked a middle course, and he was satisfied that, in general, men get their deserts far more nearly than they suppose. Knowing his own powers to be of very moderate compass, he felt himself also endowed with wisdom's most precious gift, the habit of sqEaring one's desires with one's powers. l7 On the whole, the scheme of the universe con ten ted him;18 and though born in a depraved age, he could console himself with the reflection that at such a time repu te for virtue is all the more cheaply obtained." So neither deploring what was past nor dreading what was to come, if he had his life to live again he would order itas he had ordered it already."
To defend . the equity of nature's distribution of happiness is hard enough; but it is still harder to vindicate her profound and complete wisdom in apportioning human qualities. Montaigne, though he does not undertake to jus tify whatever is actual, will go a long distance in apologizing for what most men blame. Like Henry V, he t hinks there is some soul of goodness in things evil, would men observingly distil it out, and so he is at pains to show the touch of generosity by which many a vice is in part redeemed." But he is careful not to overstate this obligation to be charitable. His mind was far too critical to be betrayed into cutting the basis from all cn tiClsm. Mon taigne was not going to adopt a view of the human values which would forbid him to reproba te, for example, religious persecution, the Parlement of Bordeaux, or a Protestant reformer. So he is forced either to revise his ' criterion or to interpret "nature" in such a sense as will make these groups seem "unnatural." In most of his essays he elects for the second alternative. We find that the natural is the average, and that the fault of these blameworthy persons is their deviation from the average. But it at once occurs to him that there may be , deviation either way; so we get the very bold inference that the popular hero no less than the pop)llar scoundrel is a freak whose appearance is to be deplored. ' In a remarkable passage we are bidden to suspect all conduct which goes beyond the ordinary limit in either direction," and again we hear of the profound value of tha t Scripture which says "Be not righteous overmuch."" Montaigne knew the faults of the ancient church, but thinks his father was most sagacious in seeing from the first how Lutheranism would do far more harm than good, because an unshaken authority is what most men need in religion, and he could wish .that in his own time the incessant pamphleteering by Protestants-some of whom were able men-had been devoted to a better purpose. Perhaps if we could create a new world, we might with advantage create a different one, but-unlike Cadmus or Pyrrhawe are born into a world already arranged, and only at the cost of breaking all can we wrest it from "the accustomed habit and fold it hath taken."" Is it needful to tell us that such a man found his favourite authors in Plutarch andSeneca? Only at times does he rise to the heroic mood of his twenty-fifth Essay, setting forth the perfect con ten tmen t wi th which a philosopher should look out upon life-the serenity of countenance and temper, the reflected health of the body, the virtues which have ceased to be an effort ora burden. Seneca and Plutarch, too, had such exalted moments. But for them, as for Montaigne, what Gibbon called . "sober discretion" commonly sufficed.
What other voices from an tiqui ty could stir so responsive a chord in the heart of one thus disillusioned, fretted by a world ou t of joint, with a shrunken estimate of what philosophy could do, and yet temperamentally anxious to make the most of such sources of encouragement as were still . available?
IV
Here, then, I come back to the question with which I began: Is "wisdom" the special quality of Montaigne? Andrew Lang once said of him that he was "a man's writer, not a woman's," but immediately added "a tired man's, not a fresh man's." One remembers, too, that Macaulay, when beginning to break up after a lifetime of radiant health, said he felt like writing "a queer, Montaignish essay." What is the peculiar wisdom, or appeararice of wisdom, or counterfeit of wisdom, that is a man's rather than a woman's, and especially a tired man's?
No doubt, for one thing, it is the ability to hold judgment in suspense where evidence is insufficient.· Men, on the whole, seem to be less in an in tellectual hurry. This virtue, too, increases rather suspiciously with increasing exhaustion; we know the growing dislike to make up one's mind. As we try to state the qualities Lang meant as appealing to a tired man, they do suggest a summary of the spirit of Mon taigne. The tired man likes a sedative to enthusiasm. He welcomes a reassuring word that the world needs no drastic treatment, that the course of things will right itself, that eager reformers are rash people, probably self-conscious, and likely t6 do more harm than good; that, in any case, in the realm of ideas as elsewhere, there is nothing new under the sun. Thus alternately roused in to a mordant cynicism and soothed in to a universal tolerance, the tired man is a familiar spectacle. We all, says Lang, come to Montaigne, late indeed, but at last, and rest in his panelled library. No doubt we do. We have moods in which his charm is altogether fascinating, . irresistible. But my question is whether this is wisdom, unless we mean by wisdom no more than a comfortable ' adaptability to our surroundings. Swift once defined a bench as a seat well bolstered and cushioned for the repose of old and gou ty lim bs. There is such a thing as an intellectual bench, that we all soonet: or later enjoy and need, when we have reached the state described by Hamlet as "most weak hams." But is "wisdom" the right word for it? One may say of the Montaigne way of thinking what Montaigne said of philosophy itself, that it is an excellent thing if not carried to excess. Perhaps one should add that it sui ts certain times, but by no means certain other times, and that the late sixteenth century had need of something quite different. I am not unmindful of the surpassing value of those appeals for a toleran t mind, those warnings against the superstition that issues in cruelty, addressed with such power to an age in which Geneva h.ad Bartholomew, andLondon habitually saw the examination of witnesses under torture-carried out at times by even so enlightened a judge as Lord Chancellor Bacon. But think of another aspect of the Essais. Montaigne was living in a period of eagerness, a period which had been thrilled by great events-the discoveries of a new continent, the Copernican 'astronomy, the birth of modern medicine, the religious Reformation, the whole turmoil of, new:, ideas which inspired his brilliant younger contemporary to write the Novum Organum. Nothing remotely resembling the project of a Novum Organum occupied his thoughts in his arm-chair as he looked through the bay-windows on that "farre-reaching prospect." The reflections stirred in him were on the uselessness of exploration, the hollow and illusory character of scientific progress, the folly of attempting any reform in church or state, and the confidence with which the automatic course of things might always be awaited. This from one who included among his contemporaries Copernicus and Tycho Brahe, Drake and Raleigh and Frobisher, Vesalius and Eustachius, William the Silent and Elizabeth! Do we really believe, even after the festive commemoration of a quater-centenary, that the wisest Frenchman who ever lived can have been one so remote from the interests of his time, so undiscerning in estimate of its significance, so determined to take no share in its effort?
